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TWO PREAMBLES: A DISTINCTION BETWEEN
FORM AND SUBSTANCE*
T is generally admitted that the science and philosophy
of Jurisprudence constitute the foundation of our whole
legal establishment. In practice, however, there is little or no
concern with or about the foundation once a house is built.
Thereafter it is a question of how the superstructure can
best be partitioned off into rooms and apartments so as to
accommodate the growing necessities of the occupants. It
requires a positive act of the will to remember that one who
is sleeping on the third floor is resting not so much upon the
mattress as upon the supporting walls of the basement.
Nothing short of an earthquake is able to wake us up to a
clear realization of the distinction between primary and
secondary supports. The study of Jurisprudence has suffered
because of an over-zealous devotion on part of the legal pro-
fession to the doctrine of proximate cause. The drill of re-
search generally goes down just far enough to reach the oil
of a controlling precedent and not an inch beyond.
Few attorneys are prepared to separate fundamentals
from the accidentals of the law they practice. The difference
*This article was read before the Jurisprudence Round Table at the Conven-
tion of the Association of American Law Schools in Chicago, Illinois, December
30, 1936.
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between methods of procedure and underlying principles of
elementary justice has been cut to pieces by the sharp divi-
sions of our intensive specialization.
But as yet there has been no formal or even conscious sur-
render to pure pragmatism as a legal system. The American
lawyer who will not essay to defend what he calls "funda-
mental American principles" or, more frequently, "the Amer-
ican form of government," is a rare specimen indeed. The
generality of these defenses is a bombast of denunciation for
Socialism, Communism, Fascism and Anarchy. All of these
political heresies are assumed to be equally bad and we are
induced to conclude that they are distinguished in nomen-
clature but without differences in practice or theory.
This is as close as the listening general public ever gets to
an understanding of the supporting fundamentals of our law
and its complementary institution, namely, Politics. Popular
opinion is liquored up with emotion rather than sobered with
reason and scientific distinction. The resulting attitude of
the publc mind is not logical but psychological. It is a sus-
tained state of trance ever ripe for the incantations of polit-
ical witch doctors who are familiar with the right words.
Because they cannot properly brief what they have not
had time and inclination to study and understand, our law-
yers have not adequately represented the defendant Ameri-
can principle before the bar of Public Opinion. The popular
judgment has consequently been taken by default. Mean-
while, the superstructure of our legal system has gone on
functioning but its base has been steadily shifting from the
bedrock of individual liberty upon which it was originally
constructed, over toward that old camping ground of all
other ancient and modern governments, namely, the volcanic
field of State Absolutism.
Some years ago the eight-story Bell Telephone Building
in the city of Indianapolis was moved onto an adjoining lot
and turned completely around. While the building was mov-
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ing, employees of the Telephone Company went in and out
and about their regular business as usual. There was not
even a momentary interruption in the telephone service in
and through the city. One of the employers described it thus:
"We had to go outside in order to realize that the building
was not exactly where it always had been."
It is likewise difficult to convince the average American
lawyer that the perspective of his profession has changed
since his school days, that it is still changing, and that the
shift will soon take the direction of a revolution unless we
immediately and deliberately re-anchor ourselves to the good
earth of fixed first principles.
But what is a principle? By a far too frequent and alto-
gether unscientific use, the word "principle" has been broad-
ened out of most of its original depth. Corpus Juris calls it
Clan equivocal term" which "may denote either the radical
elementary truths of a science or those consequential axioms
which are founded on radical truths, but which are used as
fundamental truths by those who do not find it expedient to
have recourse to first principles." Dictionaries have defined
((principle" variously, as a "a cause," "a source," "an origin,"
"a motion," "an ultimate element," as "that from which
something else flows."
Each of us has the notion that we can properly and def-
initely define "principle" and yet we repeatedly use the word
as a synonym for a vague generality that for the most part
is without discrimination.
This welter of uncertainty, if not of confusion, is unhap-
py and unfortunate because the notion somehow inheres that
a principle is a thing to be defended and preserved at all
hazards, since its very nature gives it an essential quality of
fixed permanence. To mistake for a principle, therefore,
something that is not a principle at all is to waste our
strength in defense of a pure accidental, and to give an un-
compromising quality of rigidity to that which should, per-
haps, be as flexible as running water. Futhermore, our vali-
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ant stubborn defenses of these mirages of principle may re-
sult in the ultimate destruction of the real genuine article.
It is as if we should leave the citadel of truth unprotected
while we take the armies of our logic on a forced march to
the protracted defense of an unimportant outlying barbed
wire entanglement. We may thus lose the substance while
we frantically fight for its shadow.
For the purposes of this paper, I wish to use the term
"principle" in a very restricted sense. I shall regard it as a
reason why a thing is done as distinguished from how that
thing is accomplished. This conception of "principle" distin-
guishes it clearly from the methods through and by which
it is applied. To confuse the method of applying a principle
with the principle itself is like mixing the notion of a partic-
ular place with our special manner of getting there.
Let us assume that we are about to start on a journey to
Philadelphia. The rate per mile cost of our ticket, the speed
of the train, the time of its departure and arrival, the avail-
ability of sleeping accommodations-all these things will be
interesting and important matters of concern, but all of them
will be secondary considerations. Our primary consideration
is Philadelphia. Do we, or do we not, wish to go there?
Whether we travel by air or water, by motor or by rail,
Philadelphia is our fixed, unchanging objective. It is the rea-
son for, or more properly, the end of our journey. Philadel-
phia is fundamental; the railway, highway, airplane, these
are accidental and complementary conveniences. We cannot
abandon Philadelphia without changing the whole course of
our underlying purpose, but the methods of attaining Phila-
delphia can and undoubtedly should be changed to suit the
time and circumstances surrounding the trip.
American law and government has its Philadelphia of pur-
pose and principle, and it likewise possesses complementary
accidentals in the form of ways and means by which that
principle and purpose is intended to be achieved. Even the
more scholarly of our constitutional commentators have of-
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ten confused the great objective of all our American govern-
ment with certain time-honored methods that have been
traditionally employed by that government in order to reach
that objective.
For instance, much that now goes into the general discus-
sion of American Political Science would lead us to believe
that Democracy is the root and source, the sine qua non,
so to speak, of what we know as American law and govern-
ment. None of us will deny the great length and breadth of
the popular American impression that the "principle" of
majority rule is the thing that makes America what is is.
Strictly speaking, however, our science of law and gov-
ernment knows no such thing as the "principle" of majority
rule. There is a time-honored method of majority rule by
which one of a number of alternative courses of govern-
mental action is sometimes decided upon. But we could en-
tirely abandon Democracy and majority rule in America and
yet hold ever so fast to fundamental American principle.
My authority for this conclusion is the Preamble of the
American Declaration of Independence.
The word "principle" comes from the Latin "principium,"
meaning "beginning." A good place, therefore, to look for
American governmental principle will naturally be at the be-
ginning of American Government.
It is common knowledge that the Declaration of Inde-
pendence destroyed British Government in and for America,
but it is unfortunately not so well remembered that coin-
cident with its destruction of British Government here, the
Declaration created that uniquely principled institution
known as American Government.
The person who taught me American History in high
school was fond of saying that the Declaration cut the um-
bilical cord that connected the American baby with its Brit-
ish mother. The rest of the metaphor was left to be inferred,
namely, that mother and child both did nicely, and that the
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American infant eventually, properly, naturally and in due
course became the Democratic prototype of its parent-
one generation removed, of course, from certain traditional
aristocratic leanings that still persist in the "Mother Coun-
try."
What is overlooked in this idyllic picture is most of the
facts; namely, that this new-born child did not arrive in
natural and due course, but, like Macduff, was from its
"mother's womb untimely ripped"; that its early respiration
was entirely artificial; that at the moment of its birth it was
treated with a transfusion of life blood that was completely
alien to anything in the British lineage; and that the source
and motive power behind this new life-blood-stream was the
heart and soul of the then officially despised doctrine of
natural rights.'
American Government was not merely and naturally
sloughed off of any then existing European system. It did
not represent the scientific development of pre-existing and
established principles. The characteristic feature of Ameri-
can Government was, and still is, its novelty.
In defiance of official precedent and existing systems, the
American principle of government sprang full panoplied in-
to the political history of the world. There is no other con-
clusion possible from the documentary evidences of Ameri-
can governmental origin. He who runs may read:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident: -That all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit
1 The word "officially" is used here advisedly. The doctrine of the natural
rights of man is at least as old as Christianity. Pious philosophers had reiterated
this teaching for hundreds of years before 1776. Countless Christian secular rulers
had observed it in dealing with their subjects, either because of conscientious con-
viction or as a result of persuasion by the Papacy. Before the Declaration of In-
dependence, however, no civil government had ever been established for the ex-
pressed purpose of protecting natural God-given rights, and certainly mo gov-
ernment existing at the time the Declaration was written would have acknowledged
that its subjects had any individual natural rights that operated as an inherent
limitation upon Sovereignty.
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of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted
among men ... ,, 2
This language is as clear and fundamental as the opening
sentence of the Book of Genesis. There is a comforting final-
ity about the major premises of this declaration that is def-
initely sedative to the jumpy nerves of modern political
science. If men are created by God, that is as final as it is
definite. If they are equal before the law, that is as definite
as it is final. If they have unalienable rights which come from
God and which are above, before and beyond any govern-
ment on earth, that is as definite and final as it is clearly
contrary to the theory of every government that ever did
or does exist, save ours alone.
So much for the major premise of the new American State.
Now mark once more: "To secure these rights, governments
are instituted among men. .. ." This is the first, the funda-
mental American principle; namely, that Government is a
protective agency; that its executive, legislative and judicial
functions separately, severally and all together are pointed
to the end of protection for those rights which each of its
subjects, so-called, has received directly from the hand of
God. This is the sole purpose, the final end, the exclusive ob-
ject of all American Government, state and federal. Thus
the protection of rights-individual rights, if you please-is
the purpose of every American law and law-suit, of every
judge and jury, of every governmental agency from police-
man to President.
Here then is what we may call the Philadelphia of the
American governmental journey, because in America, gov-
ernment is, after all, a journeying process; it is a direction
and not a destination.
According to our peculiar political philosophy, govern-
ment is always a means, never an end, in itself. It is an
2 "In a commonwealth all men are born naturally free; consequently, the
people themselves, immediately and directly, hold the political power so long as
they have not transferred this power to some king or ruler." Robert Cardinal
Bellarmine, DECLsa mcs, c. 7.
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agency, and like other agencies, it is formulated for the ac-
complishment of a definite purpose. Its powers may be valid-
ly exercised only for the achievement and promotion of the
ends for which the agency itself was created.
The distinguished author of the Declaration of Independ-
ence paraphrased these conclusions in his first inaugural ad-
dress when he described the objective of his pending admin-
istration as "a wise and frugal government which shall re-
strain men from injuring one another," and "shall leave them
otherwise free to regulate their own pursuit of industry and
improvement." Many years later he reiterated the philos-
ophy of the American Declaration of Independence when he
wrote to Francis Gilmer in June of 1816:
"Our legislatures are not sufficiently apprized of the rightful limits
of their powers; that their true office is to declare and enforce only
our natural rights and duties and to take none of them from us. No
man has a natural right to commit aggression on the equal rights of
another and this is all from which the laws ought to restrain him....
The idea is quite unfounded that on entering society we surrender any
natural right."
It is not often that our courts of last resort can consistent-
ly free themselves from the narrowed particularities of the
issue before them to indulge in generalities about basic prin-
ciples of law and government. There was a greater tendency
toward such generalization in the past century than is notice-
able in our generation. Judge Cooley, in his work on Con-
stitutional Limitations,3 in discussing the attributes and ob-
jects of a constitution, says:
"In considering state constitutions we must not commit the mistake
of supposing that, because individual rights are guarded and protected
by them, they [the rights] must also be considered as owing their
origin to them. These instruments measure the powers of the rulers
but they do not measure the rights of the governed. 'What is a con-
stitution and what are its objectives? It is easier to tell what it is not
than what it is. It is not the beginning of a community nor the origin
of private rights; it is not the fountain of law nor the incipient state
of government; it is not the cause, but the consequence, of personal
s (8th ed. 1927) 95, 96.
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and political freedom; it grants no rights -to the people, but is the
creature of their power, the instrument of their coivenience. Designed
for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers which
they enjoyed before the constitution was made, it is but the frame-
work of the political government. . . . It [the constitution] presup-
poses an organized society, law, order, property, personal freedom, a
love of political liberty, and [last but not least] enough of cultivated
intelligence to know how to guard against the encroachments of tyran-
ny. A written constitution is in every instance a limitation upon the
powers of government in the hands of agents .... 1" 4 (Italics are mine.)
We must therefore conclude that American Government
is an agency, and that, as such, it is a subordinate institu-
tion. Agency implies a principal in the same degree that
servant implies a master. The average citizen has a basic
notion about this "Principal and Agent," "Master and Serv-
ant" relationship with reference to his government, but the
vast majority of these average citizens put the cart before
the horse.
Long required obedience to government on the part of
citizens and subjects has built the popular conviction that
government is master while citizen and subject are servants.
This conception is not merely ironical, it is thoroughly revo-
lutionary. We miss the revolutionary phase of the concept
only because Servant-Citizen and KVaster-Government is
now and has always been the order and tradition of govern-
ments everywhere since political history began to be record-
ed.
In putting the citizen first and government second, Amer-
ica threw the whole stream of established political science in-
to reverse order. Nobody followed our bold lead and our
national political psychology has consequently been weighted
down with the oppressive force of parallel and precedent
throughout the entire period of our constitutional history.
The unremitting power of this force is beginning to flatten
out our resistance. The rank and file of our population long
ago surrendered to a working arrangement of the Master-
4 Quoting from the argument of Bates in Hamilton v. St. Louis County
Court, 15 Mo. 3, 13 (1827).
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Government, Servant-Citizen notion. It is beginning to be
taught in the schools.
Remember that the theory of a "limited agency govern-
ment" is repugnant to the ideals of every existing govern-
ment on earth outside of the United States of America. Only
here can there be any such thing as a law that is substantial-
ly unconstitutional. Only in the United States does the citi-
zen and subject have rights that his government is bound
to respect. These distinctive features are no longer hailed
with enthusiasm by our citizenship. Where they are men-
tioned at all, it is generally in a spirit of open or veiled
criticism against the aspect of a government unable to move
quickly in response to the democratic impetus expressed
through majority rule.
After all, what about Democracy? Was it not and is it not
the fundamental Americanism? Is this not the government
of, by and for the people? What clause of the United States
Constitution puts the progressive welfare of the American
people at the mercy of Nine Old Men? These are not aca-
demic questions. They are direct challenges laid on our
American doorstep by the forces of orthodox political sci-
ence. The challenges are critically timed because at the mo-
ment our household is unprotected. Its normal and natural
defenders are off on shadow-boxing expeditions with the In-
terstate Commerce clause and the "principle" (so-called) of
the separation and delegation of powers.
Is the "Divine Right" of progressive Democracy an inte-
gral part of American "principle"? Let us resume the quo-
tation of the Declaration of Independence:
"To secure these rights, governments are instituted among
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned." (Italics are mine.) Here is the democratic theory
as it was in the beginning. Note that government does not
take its direction, its objective, its purpose from the dicta-
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tions of Democracy. Majority rule has no power to deflect
government from its job of protecting unalienable individual
rights.5
The self-evident existence of natural rights and the equal-
ly self-evident job of government to protect them is settled
long before Democracy is mentioned. Democracy is invoked
merely to determine what'route government shall take in
reaching its self-evident objective. Votes may be counted to
determine whether government shall go by rail, by road, by
water or by air; but votes cannot tell government to go else-
where than the self-evident end of government, namely, the
protection of the God-given rights of the individual man.
The governed must give their consent to the methods that
government employs in the achievement of the governmental
purpose, but the governmental purpose itself is as fixed as
"the stars in their courses" and is just as far above the range
of democratic influences.
Until the Creator, mentioned in the Declaration of In-
dependence, rules otherwise, the consent of the governed
will not be required to affirm the existence of the self-evident
truths bound up with man's life and liberty.
5 In the discussion which followed the reading of this paper, at least one
commentator in excepting to the limitations that are here described as operating
against majority rule, cited the authority of certain 16th and 17th century phil-
osophers, including Cardinal Bellarmine, who in his opinion justified all govern-
ments that were based upon the "consent of the governed." It seemed obvious
to the writer at the time that a right could not at once be natural and unalien-
able in the individual citizen, and at the same time be taken away by that citizen's
government merely because that government had been installed with the "conseAt
of the governed." This is tantamount to saying that the king, once chosen with
the acquiescense of his subjects, could thereafter "do no wrong" even though his
acts, laws and decrees violated the God-given rights of the individual citizen. I
cannot find where any of the philosophers mentioned by this critic ever directly
or indirectly inferred any such thing. On the contrary, Cardinal B3ellarmine writes:
"A bad law is not a valid law. Good laws are not a curtailment of liberty, but
the charter of every man's right. When laws do not protect men's rights, but
infringe upon them, when laws are an impediment to the community's develop-
ment and welfare, they are not good laws and they are therefore not valid laws."
DE LAiscis, c. 10.
Here the Cardinal states the American doctrine concisely, namely, that govern-
ment is continuously limited. Our supreme courts apply this doctrine when they
set aside laws that "do not protect men's rights but infringe upon them."
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Such is governmental principle and governmental method,
respectively, as planted into the cornerstone of the American
State. Since then the American citizen has not been pro-
tected merely by virtue and generosity of his King, his Par-
liament, his Governor, Legislature or Dictator as have been
the other children in the Family of Nations.'
Here the citizen has found protection in the inherent im-
potence of Government to function outside the special field
of protection outlined in the Declaration of Independence.
Beyond that field, American Government is afflicted with
"mort-main."
Up to this time little has been said about the Constitution
of the United States for the reason that we have been at-
tempting to isolate the fundamental principle of American
Government. This has kept our attention focused upon the
time when our Government began, namely, 1776. Both
American Government and American governmental principle
had endured for a considerable period of years before the
idea of our present Constitution was crystallized. We may
expect to find expression of the purpose and principle of an
institution either before or at the time of that institution's
establishment, and not ten years later. 1787 is consequently
no place to look for the letter and spirit of 1776. Once the
Declaration of Independence was adopted, American gov-
ernmental principle was an immediate matter of fact in the
Nation and all of its states. The governmental agent was
then and there hired and the scope of its protective work
was definitely marked out.
From 1776 to 1781 constitutions for all the original states
were written and adopted. These constitutions described the
6 It is foolish to speak of natural unalienable rights as existing, except
theoretically, in countries that have no practical method for protecting the in-
dividual citizen against the violation of these rights by his government. We say
that only in the United States does the citizen have rights which his government
is bound to respect, because only here may the individual citizen go into court and
have an ultra vires act of government which invades his reserved rights declared
null and void. This is the precise reason why our procedure of judicial review
is such a vitally necessary part of our natural rights theory of government.
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powers that the Governmental Agent was to exercise in the
domain of the respective states. The purpose of all these
governments was identical, namely, the protection of natural
rights. That had been settled by the document that had
brought one and all of these state governments into being,
namely, the Declaration of Independence. The forms and
procedures of these early-state governments differed widely,
especially at-first, but they all had one common feature and
that was a bill of individual rights which each Government
was bound to respect at all hazards.
The philosophy of the Declaration of Independence was
thus crystallized at once into a condition precedent as well
as a condition subsequent to American governmental power.
The constitution makers of the Revolutionary period clear-
ly understood the Master-Servant theory of citizen and gov-
ernment. There was little confusion about the respective po-
sitions of cart and horse in those horse and buggy days.
These early state constitutions were constantly being
changed. New methods were tested by the system of trial
and error. At first the system of all government by and
through the legislature was popular; then executive powers
were created. Suffrage was universally restricted in the be-
ginning. But there was no monkeying with the Bill of Rights.
All understood and agreed that to secure these rights, gov-
ernments (in one form or another) were instituted among
American men.
By 1781 a National Government was finally created by
the adoption of the first Constitution of the United States,
the Articles of Confederation, so-called. Here was trial and
error again, and by 1787 it was pretty generally agreed to
be mostly error. The National Government did not have suf-
ficient power and authority to do a creditable protective job
for the Nation as a whole.
So it came to pass that in the eleventh year of its estab-
lishment, the principle of American Government was offered
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a new containing frame and form. Those offering and urging
this new container for the American principle of government
advanced these reasons why it should be adopted:
"In order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure
domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity."
By the end of 1788 the reasoning and argument presented
by the advocates of the new form of government had pre-
vailed, and the substance and spirit of '76 were wrapped up
in the letter and line of a new Constitution for the United
States of America.
From 1776 to the present time, we have had many Con-
stitutional Conventions in the United States in addition to
the memorable Convention of 1787. Such a convention, re-
gardless of what it does to the form of government, is a revo-
lutionary proceeding only when it changes its substance. To
date we have had only one successful American Revolution.
The results that it achieved are still officially and technically
unimpaired. The substance rejected and repudiated by the
Revolution of 1776, namely, government ownership of its
subjects, still stands rejected. The substance created and
adopted by that same Revolution, namely, a protective
agency for natural rights, is still the sun of principle around
which all the forms, methods and divisions of American Gov-
ernment revolve.
Between the forms and methods of ours and other govern-
ments, there are few important differences; but between the
substantial principle of our Government and other govern-
ments, there is literally all the difference in the world. I am
aware of the fact that modern constitutional historians treat
the Declaration of Independence cavalierly. They gratui-
tously deny any but a tortured connection between 1776 and
1787. They are disposed to quote the preamble of the Con-
stitution as declarative of the American governmental pur-
pose, which it is not, instead of the purpose merely of the
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Constitution, which it is. The Constitution of 1787 did not
call into existence a new governmental servant to a new
and different job. It merely raised the salary, augmented the
authority and changed the routine of the servant hired in
1776. The Preamble of the Constitution explains, not why
the servant was hired, but merely why the added responsi-
bilities, new powers and modified routine were believed to
be desirable. Upon the fine narrow thread of thfs distinction
depends the whole ideology of our American system of law
and politics. Here hangs the only justification for our mooted
practice of judicial review for alleged ultra vires acts of any
branch of any American Government.
Unless man has natural unalienable rights which govern-
ment is instituted to protect, the system of judicial review is
an archaic impediment to the general welfare. It is only be-
cause of the basic natural unalienable rights theory of our
government that our courts, upon petition of an aggrieved
citizen, can keep governmental trespassers as well as private
trespassers out of the God-given private sanctuary of the in-
dividual man or woman.
Often, but not often enough, the United States Supreme
Court has dignified the connection between substance and
form, that is, the link between the Revolution and the Con-
stitution, by references such as we find in Gulf C. & S. F.
R. Co. v. Ellis: I
"... the latter [speaking of the Federal Constitution] is but the
body and the letter of which the former [the Declaration of Inde-
pendence] is the thought and spirit, and it is always safe to read the
letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence."
It should be much more than merely "safe" to so read the
Constitution; it ought to be necessary to do so. This is es-
pecially true now when there is increasing clamor for re-
stricting the present power of the Supreme Court to review
the acts of Congress. Here is a distinct rumble of thunder on
7 165 U. S. 150, 160 (1896).
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the left had we the ears to hear it. Where, shouts the prag-
matist, is the letter and line of constitutional authority for
judicial interference with the legislature? A line in the Con-
stitution would be sufficient, he says, but failing that, the
venerable error of Marbury v. Madison 8 should be outlawed
once and for all.
These critics miss the point entirely. Our courts do not
entertain suits involving the constitutionality of legislation
as a result of any constitutional authority conferring such
jurisdiction. Express constitutional authority would not add
one jot to the courts' power in this respect. Such suits are
entertained by our courts for the precise reason that the
courts are the tribunals to which individual citizens resort
whenever their rights are violated by anybody, including
the government. It is the inherent limitation of the govern-
ment by the natural rights of the citizen that gives the courts
jurisdiction in such cases.
The honest confusion of these critics is the common fault
of our lawyers, teachers and judges. We have allowed a gen-
eration to grow up believing that the Constitution is the
source of, rather than a protection for rights; a generation
that likewise believes that the object of government is the
"general welfare" rather than defense for the rights of in-
dividuals. Too frequently have we let go unchallenged the
statement that "Liberty must give way before the common
good" when we know or ought to know, that such a state-
ment is paradoxical. It is like the reputed practice of the
Hottentots that made the beating of one's mother the final
test of complete manhood. Where liberty is restricted, the
common good is impaired, not promoted. If liberty reaches
out to the point of injuring others, it ceases to be liberty and
becomes trespass. The liberty of one ends where the liberty
of another begins. Government properly draws the line be-
8 1 Cranch 137 (1803). This is the case in which Chief Justice Marshall de-
clared that the courts could set aside laws of Congress that conflicted with the
Constitution of the United States.
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tween but it does so to protect the invaded liberty of the
second person, and not restrict the liberty of the first. Liber-
ty is not restrained by speed limits, sanitary regulations,
prohibitions against child labor, sweat shops, sale of fraudu-
lent securities, et cetera, any more than liberty is restrained
by punishments for theft, assault and murder.
These statutes merely erect barriers of defense around the
rights of innocent second and third persons whose protec-
tion is or should be the sole concern of government. For a
working definition of liberty, go to the law of Torts and
learn that one may without liability do any act that is not
the proximate cause of injury to another's person or proper-
ty. By the same token, any practice that is or may develop
into an injury to others can and should be prohibited by
statute. Such a law is not an impairment of liberty but a
protection for it. In their present or revised form, practically
all of the laws now on our statute books could successfully
pass these tests of fundamental soundness. Rigid application
of the test to every proposed measure would therefore leave
the efficiency of our government unimpaired, while it would
stimulate a healthful awakening of the public consciousness
to the elementary protective purpose of all and every Ameri-
can law. Such an awakening will be necessary if we are to
save the procedure of judicial review.
Our judges will have to remember that they are the cus-
todians of the spirit of our constitutions and not merely the
surveyors and measurers of its letter. Judicial review must
be readvertised for what it is, namely, the practical applica-
tion of the natural rights theory of Government.
The right of our courts to hear ultra-vires charges made
by a citizen against his government is the one clamp that
binds the superstructure of our legal and political system to
its foundation of American principle. Once off that founda-
tion, the superstructure may stand for a time and so evenly
that those on the upper floors may not even sense the shift.
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Nevertheless, the heart will have gone out of our system, and
the last and only practical protection for human liberty now
existing in the world will be swept away.
With natural rights and judicial review subtracted from
our American system, foreign news accounts of "Mercy
Deaths," "Blood Purges," "Forced Labor," "Property Con-
fiscation," "Aryan Supremacy," and "Suppression of Reli-
gion" will immediately assume something more than an aca-
demic interest for us. At that point we can but pray for a
child-like faith in that old maxim of absolutism which says
that the King can do no wrong.
Clarence Manion.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.
